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Modernization theory –and the Non-Western World 
 
In this paper I want to deal with three topics: first, with the development and the 
ups and downs of modernization theory and its treatment of the non-Western 
world (I); secondly, with some basic social structure distributions and trends of 
human development for selected societies, including Islamic countries (II); 
thirdly, with modernization and modernity in the non-Western world, especially 
in the Arab world (III). This third part is based only on my reading of some 
works by area specialists and specialists on Islam; therefore, it barely represents 
more than the average layperson's current level of information today in Western 
Europe. 
 
 
I 
 
On several occasions I have described the multi-faceted field of modernization 
theory as having a threefold reference: 1) the process since the industrial 
revolution and the political revolutions at the end of the 18th century when the 
small group of today's modern societies developed in Western Europe and North 
America; 2) the many successful and unsuccessful efforts to catch up and reduce 
the gap to the leading societies by poorer and less developed countries; 3) the 
efforts of the modern societies to cope – via innovation and reform – with new 
internal problems and, more importantly, with the changing international and 
globalizing environment (Zapf 1991). 
 
Briefly, I will give you two definitions of the main features of modern 
societies. My own definition refers to the mechanisms of inclusion, value 
pluralism, differentiation and status upgrading (i.e. welfare development), and, 
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also in the sense of Talcott Parsons, to the basic institutions, which means basic 
societal inventions, namely, competitive democracy, the market economy, mass 
consumption, and the welfare state (Zapf 1991). A more dynamic definition is 
given by Johannes Berger: "Modernization is the internal achievement of a 
society; the particular processes of modernization support each other in 
combination; the leading nations do not impede the followers; the processes of 
modernization are converging in a common goal" (modern society, modernity) 
(Berger 1996: 46). This means that development cannot be explained by 
exploitation nor can it be accomplished by simply copying institutions. Despite 
the basic fact of rising differentiation there is the parallel process of rising 
interdependence. Despite visible trends of globalization the indigenous forces 
are decisive. But such concepts have been bitterly disputed in the last 50 years 
of the modernization discourse, and they also are disputed in the Islamic world 
today. 
 
Jeffrey Alexander (1994), a critical American sociologist, has outlined the 
story of the modernization discourse in his essay: "Modern, Anti, Post, and Neo: 
How social theories have tried to understand the 'New World' of 'Our Times'". 
He distinguishes four stages which coincide roughly with the last four decades 
of the 20th century: the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and the 1990s. Early modernization 
theory reconstructed Western development and, in its liberal belief of granted 
progress and the universalization of American values, projected them world-
wide, especially on the developing countries. One popular model combines 
political development (state- and nation-building, participation, redistribution), 
economic growth, and social mobilization with cultural rationalization, psychic 
mobilization and international transformation (Zapf 1969: 23; Berger 1996: 53). 
 
Against this doctrine a radical Marxist criticism of capitalism arose in 
dependencia theory and in world-systems theory. Both explained 
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underdevelopment at the periphery by exploitation through the capitalist centre. 
The dependencia school believes that dependency is an external condition, that 
the centre nations get all the benefits from unequal exchange, and that the 
peripheral countries should sever their ties with the core countries. The world-
system school adds the concept of semi-peripheries with an economic emphasis 
on import-substitution; this school shifts its focus from the nation-state to the 
whole world; long-term historical trends are its units of analysis (So 1990). Both 
theories predicted the transition, already underway, of late capitalism into 
socialism. However, when this transition failed to occur and when some 
developing countries, especially in East Asia, made spectacular progress, the 
controversy lost its momentum. Several theories of post-modernism tried to "de-
construct" liberal modernization theory as well as the Marxist alternatives. Post-
modernists ridiculed these approaches as out-dated "great narratives" and tried 
to substitute them with multiple cultural and constructivist contingency theories. 
But with the breakdown of Communism and with the success of some Asian and 
South American countries attention again turned toward the preconditions and 
achievements of democracy and the market economy. 
 
Since 1987/8 the number of democratic regimes has increased from 66 to 
121 states (Freedom House: 9). This stage is called by Jeffrey Alexander, 
Edward Tiryakian and others (including me) as “neo-modernism” or 
“modernization II” which indeed relies on democracy and free economic 
development, this time however without the concept of convergence to Western 
cultural patterns and without underestimating nationalist and fundamentalist 
counter-movements. Tiryakian has summarized neo-modernization analysis 
(NMA) as follows: 
 
1. Modernization is the result of actions by individuals and collectives, not 
an automatic development of systems. 
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2. They seek new ways to achieve their goals and fulfil their values; but 
whether these aims can be accomplished, will depend on their resources. 
3. Modernization is not a consensual process, but a competition between 
modernizers, conservatives and bystanders. 
4. Science is a major driving force, but religion and tradition must not be 
underestimated. 
5. The general criterion for the success of modernization is the welfare 
development of the whole population. 
6. Centres of modernization may change and move. 
7. Modernization is not continuous-linear; it has also cycles and regressive 
crises (Tiryakian 1998). 
 
Only a few years ago we considered neo-modernism as the state of the art but, in 
the meantime, we seem to have already entered a new stage (for which I do not 
yet have a good label); fundamentalist and/or terrorist threats in several parts of 
the world would seem to rectify S. Huntington's (1993) hypothesis of a "clash of 
civilizations" as the most relevant conflict at the beginning 21st century. "The 
fundamental source of conflict is shifting from ideological or economic to 
cultural. … Lines between cultures are defined as 'fault lines', and the Velvet 
Curtain of culture is … the latter day equivalent of the divisive and provocative 
iron curtain of old" (Hartmann 1995: 115/6). But before I take up that topic I 
would like to give a brief account of the treatment of the non-Western world 
during the stages of modernization theory just described. 
 
As you know, the modernization of the West was already the subject of the 
classics of sociology around the turn of the 20th century: industrialization and 
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the growth of productive forces in Marx, differentiation in Spencer, 
differentiation as specialization and, at the same time, new forms of solidarity in 
Durkheim, rationalization in Max Weber. But Weber, other than Marx or 
Durkheim, stated that the encompassing process of rationalization was a 
speciality of the "occident", the West, and he asked, "What linkage of 
circumstances has led to the result that just in the occident and only here, 
cultural phenomena appeared which represented a developmental direction of 
universal importance and validity?" Weber's explanatory variables, as you also 
know, were the drive to capital accumulation in conjunction with the rational 
ethics of ascetic Protestantism (Weber 1920/2002: 557-572). 
 
As to the early modernization theory of the 1950/60s one must remember 
that this theory was designed as a program explicitly directed to the non-
Western world, that is, it was devoted to the "export" of Western institutions and 
values. An early classic, Daniel Lerner's "The Passing of Traditional Society" 
from 1958, states (p. 51): "Our concern is with large historical movement, now 
becoming visible in the Middle East, of which an enlarged capacity for empathy 
is the distinctive psychic component. Our interest is to clarify the process 
whereby the high empathizer tends to become also the cash customer, the radio 
listener, the voter". The data in this study came from early survey research of 
1950/51 in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iran. 
 
Dependencia and world-systems theories by definition concentrate on the 
non-Western world, as the periphery of a capitalist centre which, according to 
proponents of these theories, gained its leading position by exploitation, that is, 
by "the development of underdevelopment" (Baran; Frank). During the stage of 
culturalism and constructivism, which still has influence today, the non-Western 
world was considered to have committed the same fallacies as the West by not 
being aware that there is no reality outside our interpretations of it, and that even 
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"tradition" is invented or constructed. (As an aside, the merit of the cultural or 
constructivist view is the distinction of modernization qua process and 
modernity qua civilization, and the discussion of the "dark side", namely, the 
violence, social cost and alienation produced in this civilization; cf. Mergel 
1997: 203-232.) The neo-modernism stage was also challenged, for example, by 
theories of globalization, even "cosmopolitization", on the one hand, and by 
non-Western resistance/opposition, which Huntington described as a "clash of 
civilizations", or even shorter as the "West against the rest". I shall turn to these 
challenges more briefly in the third section of this paper. 
 
 
II 
 
I would like to digress here to discuss some comparative data on human 
development in selected countries. The data are taken from the Human 
Development Reports (1993; 2002) of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), published annually since 1990. For comparison I have 
selected six Arab countries, two Post-Communist countries, five OECD 
countries, Niger as the poorest country, and the aggregates for the Arab states 
and the OECD states. Human Development is measured by a combination of 
three components: life expectancy at birth, literacy of the population over 15 
years of age plus the school enrolment ratio for all students (as a percentage of 
all youth), and the GNP per capita in U.S. dollars (at purchasing parity). The 
Human Development Index HDI is presented as a fraction of 1.0; for simplicity I 
have multiplied it by 1000. 
 
 
 
 
  
Human Development 1975 – 2000, Selected Countries 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Human Development Report 2002, pp.149-156; 1993, pp.135-137. 
HDI Index (max. = 1000) Country Life 
expectancy
in years 
Literacy
in % 
15 ys.+ 
School 
Enrolment
in % 
GNP 
per capita  
PPP US $ 
HDI 
rank 2000 1995 1985 1975 
Change 
1975/2000  
in % 
           
Saudi Arabia 71.6 76.3    61 11367 71 759 737 670 587 29 
Turkey 69.8 85.1 62 6974 85 742 717 654 593 25 
Iran 68.9 76.3 73 5884 98 721 688 607 556 30 
Algeria 69.6 66.7 72 5308 106 697 663 600 501 39 
Egypt 67.3 55.3 76 3635 115 642 605 532 435 48 
Morocco 67.6 48.9 52 3546 123 602 569 508 429 40 
          
Czech Rep. 
(CSSR) 
74.9 97.6 70 13991 33 849 843 (931)  (-9) 
Russian Union 
(UdSSR) 
66.1 99.6 78 8377 60 781 779 (827)  (-6) 
          
Sweden 79.7 99.0 100 24277 2 941 925 883 863 9 
United States 77.0 99.0 95 34142 6 939 925 898 863 9 
Japan 81.0 99.0 82 26755 9 933 923 893 854 9 
Germany 77.7 99.0 94 25103 17 925 907 868 (967) (-4) 
Spain 78.5 97.6 95 19472 21 913 895 855 819 11 
          
Niger 45.2 15.9 16 746 172 277 262 246 234 18 
          
Arab states 66.8 62.0 62 4793  (32-144) 653     
OECD states 76.8 99.0 87 23569 (1-28) 905     
W
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Theoretically, the chosen indicators are the elements of a "basic needs" 
approach but they are also the elementary building blocks of any 
modernization theory: health, elementary and further education, economic 
resources from basics to mass consumption. Substantively, I want to draw 
your attention, for the moment, only to the following findings: 
 
1. The Arab states are in a middle position in the world ranking, having 
made impressive improvements over the last 25 years. If we go back 
further, since about 1950, the Arab states have evolved from mostly 
illiterate populations to mostly literate ones, as D. Lerner predicted 
(Russett 1964: 223/4). 
2. The gap between the Arab states and the OECD states, in terms of 
the HDI, is around 30%, but the former nearly equal Eastern Europe 
with Russia, and they surpass most of Africa. 
3. The change among OECD states is limited because they are near the 
ceilings. The change in some post-Communist countries is negative, 
and even Germany still shows the burden of unification. 
 
 
III 
 
Now let us return to modernization theory and the Arab world. 
 
It was not just the ideas of Huntington that dashed the hopes of neo-
modernism which had been so welcomed by many post-Communist 
countries, their politicians and social scientists. Several dramatic social-
structural events and some new accents in the theoretical modernization 
discourse contributed to this reversal. In the 1990s three developments did 
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not fit into the neo-modernist scheme. Initially, we had the Asian “miracle” 
and the doctrine that Asian values (achievement with high discipline and 
low individualism, economic growth before democratization) would win 
the future, but the subsequent breakdowns in Asian economies soon ended 
this euphoria (Zapf 1996: 72/73). Second, disappointment has prevailed in 
many post-Communist countries because they have not been able to 
manage simultaneous development of democracy and economic growth in 
the liberated markets, and they have not been able to offset the growing 
poverty and increased inequality among their citizenry with functioning 
welfare-state institutions and provisions. Third, religious fundamentalist 
attacks in several, mostly Islamic, countries have culminated in terrorism 
against centre states and warfare in the countries from which the 
fundamentalism emanates. 
 
Two “grand old men”, critics of the world-system and culturalist 
schools of modernization, have become active again. Immanuel Wallerstein 
(2003) gives a sobering account of the failures of the anti-capitalist 
movements (including socialism); at the same time, however, he also sees 
no possibilities for neo-modern capitalism. Wallerstein gloomily speaks of 
"entering global anarchy", a dark period of struggle between the major 
actors in the world system, the outcome of which is unknown and 
uncertain. Shmuel Eisenstadt (1999: 37-50; here p. 40) vaguely sketches a 
picture of "multiple modernities" with no visible trend toward convergence; 
his vision, however, also does not crystallize in Huntington's clash of 
civilizations. According to Eisenstadt, multiple modernities have similar 
problems, but the solutions differ greatly; the result should be "several 
modern civilizations", perhaps even including fundamentalist and new 
communal-national movements. 
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What do we learn from specialists on Islam regarding the clash of 
civilizations, global anarchy and multiple modernities? The first lesson is 
that there is not at all any unified, comprehensive organization of a 
fundamentalist Islam: rather, we are observing competition between 
fundamentalism, Islamic reformism and secular modernism. 
Fundamentalism or Islamism is understood basically as a modern reaction 
to Western dominance, based on a dogmatic interpretation of the holy 
scriptures, designed to build up an aggressive offensive of Islamic peoples. 
Islamic reformism has been present since the early 20th century. The 
underlying aim of this movement is to overcome the degradation of the 
West through reforms within Islam societies; implied here is 
technological/economic catch-up, but in accordance with the tenets laid out 
in the Koran. Modernism is the movement to establish democratic 
institutions within the Islamic religious diaspora, whereby some European 
ideas will be incorporated but Arabic socialism soundly rejected (Elger 
2001:100, 260, 203).  
 
The second lesson is that Arab nations show remarkable differences in 
adapting and transforming modern patterns. "Islam [does] not equal one 
Islam" (Metzger 2002: 7). Where Islamists participate in government they 
are least inclined toward violence and their countries develop in the 
direction of an "Islamic democracy". Lebanon and Jordan get good grades 
in this respect; Morocco is praised for her reforms, especially women's 
rights; Turkey and Egypt have or had made successful steps toward 
democracy. Even Iran, despite the revolution, is credited for achieving 
some democratization, including holding free elections and restoring civil 
rights; Schirin Ebadi, for example, just recive the Nobel Peace Prize. One 
German observer summarizes thus: "(The modernity envisaged by Islamic 
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intellectuals does) not equal the Western-liberal model but it contains 
important principles of a democratic order, like political participation, 
government responsibility, protection of human rights" (Metzger 2002: 7-
15). 
 
Problematic, in the eyes of Islamists, is internal strife within individual 
Islamic societies, especially conflict between political interests disguised in 
religious terms, and discontent fomented by religious aspirations 
(fundamentalism) beyond the existing states and nations. Another source of 
internal conflict is the "rentier state"/rentier economy in practice, which 
serves the interest of small elite groups and clashes with Islam-centred 
models of politics. The rentier state model attributes the wealth of some 
Arab states to the effect of petrodollars, i.e. windfall profits from oil 
exports; this gives the ruling elites of those states near independence from 
other domestic groups and social classes (Moaddel 2002: 376-378). The 
Western nations must develop a better understanding of all these features, 
including the counter-intuitive facts that most terrorists do not belong to the 
very poor, but rather to the well-educated, and that suicide missions are 
regarded by some as a holy service. The Western nations can no longer 
expect to be regarded by the rest as the masters whose life styles and values 
can (and are to be) simply taken over. 
 
Overall, to summarize, recent modernization theory regards the Islamic 
route to modernity as one of several paths with an uncertain ending. It does 
not change the basic notion that uneven development and gaps in individual 
and collective welfare – and not foremost civilization differences – are the 
main reasons for conflict up to the extremes of suicide attacks. "Taking an 
evolutionary-functionalist perspective on change alters the debate about the 
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'clash of civilizations' because it suggests that seemingly irreconcilable 
cultural differences are more a product of different rates of modernization 
than of permanent cultural divisions" (Chirot 2001: 345). This is still the 
hard-nose position of modernization theorists who would point to 
indicators like the HDI. Indigenous improvements, albeit in international 
cooperation, are irreplaceably necessary in order to loosen the present 
tensions and the threat of violence. 
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